Glasgow, Scotland’s largest urban agglomeration and once celebrated as the British Empire’s Second City, in the 1950s embarked on an ambitous enterprise. The goal was to rehouse large portions of its then 1.1 million inhabitants in the wider metropolitan area. For this purpose three New Towns – Cumbernauld, East Kilbride, and Irvine – were established 30-50 kilometres from Glasgow’s city centre. In addition, several “overspill estates” were built on the periphery as well as tower block schemes in the wider urban area. The measures were in line with British national policy, which since the 1946 New Towns Act promoted decentralization and comprehensive regeneration of Britsh cities.

In Glasgow, these plans are now widely regarded as a failure and the root of many problems that affect the city to date. Entire neighbourhoods of late-nineteenth-century tenements were demolished, social structures disrupted, and, most importantly, both New Towns and overspill estates never fulfilled the promise of becoming attractive residential areas. The situation was enhanced by economic recession and the decline of heavy industriy, which in the 1960s led to mass unemployment, and from which the city to date has not yet fully recovered.

I will argue that one reason for the failure of the decentralization programme was precisely that it was not built on a clear vision of metropolitan region. The image of metropolitan urbanity was largely regarded es negative; instead the policies followed a small-town ideal of independent municipal entities with little regional cohesion. This is evidenced by the architecture and planning principles of both New Towns and overspill estates well as the deficient infrastructure. The results of these policies are a challenge for Glasgow’s metropolitan region to date.